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Showing posts with label aristocracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aristocracy. Show all posts

Monday, 21 September 2015

Awkward Identities in Merovingian Trier

[While I was at the Austrasia conference, a number of people mentioned the problem of knowing why Metz was chosen as the capital, or chief urban royal residence, of that realm.  As part of my on-going, irregular attempt to put all my unpublished 'back-catalogue' on-line I present this paper from 2001, in which I attempt to answer that question by looking at why Trier was not established as the capital, given its imperial past.  The argument is essentially that the very Romanness and imperial pretensions of Trier made it very difficult for the Merovingians to inscribe their political identity over that.  More to the point, the bishops of Trier had a tradition of standing up to secular power, most stridently visible, perhaps, in the career of the long-live St Nicetius.  After the Justinianic wars (this is one of the earliest, tentative steps towards the argument I have been espousing more recently) it was easier for the Merovingians, and other post-imperial rulers, to choose lesser Roman towns that had the trappings of a royal capital but without too heavy baggage from an imperial past.  It was originally the last in a series of seminars on towns held at the Institute of Classical Studies and notionally co-organised by me and Richard Alston (in fact Richard did about 80% of the organisation), so the specific references here and there to other scholars works is to their papers in the series.  Naturally it is pretty much viva voce and lacks any apparatus, but I hope you might find it of interest.]
The reasons for this paper are several.  On the one hand I thought it would be as well for me to get away from talking about Metz – indeed when they heard I was speaking in this series, more than one person commented ‘I suppose you’ll be talking about Metz then’.  Well, how better to avoid this unfortunate pigeon-holing than by getting completely away from that city, writing about another city and its region entirely?  And where better than Trier, which is a good seventy-five kilometres away from Metz, as the crow flies, significantly more if you go via the Mosel?   
Now rather old plan of Trier by Kurt Böhner
More seriously, Trier features prominently in the secondary literature, often as a sort of paradigmatic north-east Gaulish city, largely as a result of the fact that it has been so often, so thoroughly and so well worked over by very prominent Romanists and medievalists, historians, numismatists, epigraphers and archaeologists: Edith Wightman, Eugen Ewig, Kurt Böhner, Nancy Gauthier, H.H. Anton and so on.  And this in turn is largely because Trier is very well served with evidence of diverse kinds.  Yet when I was writing my doctoral thesis on Metz I noticed that Trier was different from Metz; at the time, and when I wrote the book based upon the thesis, I thought this was because Metz was unusual (which it is), but what has struck me increasingly since then is just how profoundly different and unusual – indeed just plain weird – Trier itself is, far more so than Metz.  This individuality, and it seems to be a conscious individuality, would seem to be a theme running throughout late antique and early medieval Trier: The city is, obviously, important in the Late Roman period, and its distinctiveness remains very clear in the Merovingian period, as I shall argue, but it doesn’t stop there; in the Carolingian period, the Trierer aristocracy is very self-consciously independent, and by the end of the first millennium this area is at the heart of a new regional identity, that of Lotharingia, the Middle Kingdom.  For this reason Matthew Innes and I decided that the Triererland would make a good project upon which we could test out our ideas about Merovingian and Carolingian society and politics, nicely situated between, but different from, the regions of Metz and Mainz upon which we have worked individually.  Thus what I am going to say today represents very much, not even work in progress, but some initial ideas, formulations and questions. 
Something else, which has intrigued me for a long time, ever since my Metz work, has been why the Merovingian kings of Austrasia settled upon Metz as their principal urban seat.  After all, why not Trier, the former imperial capital, just down the Mosel?  Then it has become apparent to me that this is only part of a wider phenomenon: post-Roman kings did not choose leading Roman political centres as the capitals of their kingdoms.  The Visigoths in Spain chose Toledo, not the more important cities of Cordoba, or Mérida, or Tarragona, or Barcelona.  The Lombards in Italy could not, obviously, use Rome or Ravenna, but nor did they make much use of Milan.  Instead Pavia became their royal centre.  And the Merovingians eschewed Trier, Rheims, Arles or Lyons, in favour of Paris and Metz, neither of which (it may come as a surprise to Parisiens) was very significant at all in the Roman period. Now this seems to be true mainly for the later phase of post-Roman kingdoms.  The Ostrogoths in Italy used Ravenna, and the Vandals made their base in Carthage.  Kingdoms of the sixth century, however, as stated, seem to have steered clear of the major Roman political centres.  Given the general quest by early medieval kings for that modern commodity, Romanitas, this seems all the more surprising, but the case of the Merovingians and Trier may permit a way into exploring this problem.  And the distinctiveness of the Triererland turns out not to be unrelated to this issue.  Alas, this does mean talking somewhat about Metz.  It is difficult to talk about why one town was not adopted as a capital without some discussion of the neighbouring city which was chosen. 
Finally, I must state at the outset that I was inspired, and put on to the track towards much of what I am about to say today, by examining the PhD thesis of Mark Handley, on the early medieval inscriptions of Gaul, Spain and Britain.  What I am going to say regarding inscriptions is derived from his work, and I’d like to make that debt clear from the outset. 
Trier, in many ways, needs no introduction but some reminder of the background will still be useful.  Situated on the right bank of the Mosel, it was one of the great cities of Roman Gaul.  For today’s purposes it is worth noting at the outset that the Treveri were always a rather unusual group within Roman Gaul.  They were one of the very few northern civitates to produce senators, and in the third century the prosperity of the region’s aristocracy seems to be manifest in the large, and much debated, monuments which they erected, such as the famous Igelsaüle.   
Trier was at the heart of the late Roman Empire.  From the late third century and the period of the Gallic emperors through to 388 and the suppression of the usurper Magnus Maximus Trier was frequently the capital of the western Empire.  Indeed its use as a capital can be argued to have been a key factor in the continuing survival of the western Empire.  As a result of imperial presence, the city was endowed with several splendid monuments: the Kaiserthermen, built by Constantine, and the famous Aula Palatina.  Here we see the Aula Palatina, built, according to a coin of Severus found in a wall, some time shortly after 305.  In some ways I think the Aula Palatina stands as a metaphor of the late Roman Empire and its historiography.  Seen here it seems, especially alongside the rather twee baroque Archbishop Elector’s palace, like a huge imposing monolith, a building to sum up the A.H.M. Jones image of the late Roman state.  However, just as subsequent generations have been less impressed by the efficiency of the late Roman Empire or taken in by its rhetoric, it is as well to remember that originally, the interior of the Aula Palatina was covered with frescoes and mosaics, and the outside was plastered, whitewashed, painted with false joinery, and appointed with all sorts of, to use the technical term, twiddly bits, making it look much less of a monster.  Even more of the time, I imagine, it looked a bit shabby and run down.  This was part of a huge palatine complex at Trier, including a circus, refurbishment to the amphitheatre and the construction of a large double-cathedral.  The provision of imperial ceremonial and spectacle was clearly very important; the association of palace and the other elements is reminiscent of the slightly later new imperial capital at Constantinople.  Other building associated with the imperial presence took place under Valentinian I and Gratian, involving riverside warehouses and modifications to the other major structures, with the imperial baths possibly being used as a palatine barracks. 
The imperial presence was a decisive factor, just as Hugh Kennedy showed that the difference between the fates of Scythopolis and Gerasa was related to the presence of imperial government and its money.  Other northern Gallic towns, as was mentioned last week, are, in the late Empire characteristically much reduced with small walled administrative redoubts at their core.  Very little, if any, new public building was done and the extent to which the areas outside the walled circuits were still occupied is still debated and, though it was doubtless more common than was once supposed, we should remember that the walls usually enclosed areas of 20 Ha or less.  At Paris the defended areas were the Île de la Cité and the left bank’s forum.  The centrality of imperial patronage is also, as it happened, graphically demonstrated at Metz, the next city on Trier’s lifeline to the south.  Here there is an unusually large walled circuit, possibly the largest late Roman circuit in the north, given that Trier’s enormous walled circuit was built early in the Roman period, and may well have been more a curse than a blessing; it would be difficult to defend it all.  Metz also has fourth-century public building, this civic basilica at St-Pierre-aux-Nonnains being constructed probably in the reign of Valentinian I and clearly modelled upon the Trier basilica.  It may well be the last such piece of new civic building in the western Roman Empire north of the Alps at least.   
This continued prosperity was carried over into the rural areas of the region.  The Treveri, like the Mediomatrici to their south, survived the crises of the late third century pretty well.  Overall, about half of the villas known in the region continue to be occupied through the fourth century, although there are regional variations, with the west of the civitas suffering worse than the areas immediately around Trier itself.  Fourth-century occupation is particularly well attested in the lower Eiffel.  More to the point, perhaps, some of the late Roman villas of the Trier region are very impressive affairs.  There is the palatial, possibly imperial villa at Konz, the three-storey and defensible, if not fortified, villa at Pfalzel, Welschbillig, Nennig and Echternach.  Imperial ownership has been suggested for Konz and possibly Pfalzel.  Welschbillig appears to be the focus for the huge estate surrounded by the Langmauer.  Since this earthwork was constructed by troops (primani), an imperial connection of some sort seems likely, though it could also (if perhaps with less likelihood) have been access to imperial patronage by a leading palatine aristocrat which produced this source of labour.  Again, this repays comparison with neighbouring regions, and may very well have a bearing on later developments.  The well-known changes in ideology which so affected Roman towns after the third century, and which were revisited by John Haldon in the first paper in this series, may have been less important here.  The local aristocracy may have otherwise been as unwilling as another to invest in their city – the impressive private monuments are an index of that change from private money going on public monumental munificence to private houses – but they were just as keen to acquire imperial patronage, and the heart of the distribution of that patronage was at their city.  The vici in the region also survive the third-century crisis fairly well.
After the suppression of Maximus, no legitimate emperor ever returned to Trier.  The fifth century is an obscure period.  The Roman infrastructure of the region survives better than in other areas, which is probably related to the wealth and power of the aristocracy.  In the late fifth century, Trier was ruled by a Count, Arbogast, who received a letter from Sidonius Apollinaris praising his Roman-ness, and a praise poem from the bishop of Toul.  This apparently independent Roman rule is important for our purposes. 
This part of the world was incorporated into the Merovingian realms at some point before 511, though we have no way of knowing when: the old methods of trying to map Frankish conquest by plotting the distribution of certain types of grave, or even artefact, although still employed in some quarters, are unacceptable.  For one thing, these burial styles cannot be equated with the Franks; for another the one chronological fixed point in these archaeological attempts at political history, the burial of king Childeric in Tournai in 481/2 has been shown (by me) to be nothing of the sort.  Childeric could have died five years before, or ten years after, this date.  When Clovis died in 511, however, the Moselle valley was under Frankish control.  His eldest son, Theuderic ruled the area.  Indeed, Theuderic may have been ruling the region even before his father’s death.  In the seventh century, Fredegar said that Theuderic had Metz as his capital, but he appears to have been projecting the situation of his own day back to the 511 division.  Merovingian kings never developed the idea of a permanent capital as their Lombard and Visigothic contemporaries did, but a principal urban base seems to have been chosen. As far as we can tell, Theuderic’s was Trier.  This is the town in which he is mentioned as ruling by Gregory of Tours in the Vita Patrum. 
Theuderic’s son and successor Theudebert, rex magnus francorum is associated with Trier as well, but he also appears to have had some connection with Verdun.  When he died, there was rioting in Trier and the stoning to death of his tax-collector, Parthenius, but the implication of Gregory’s account, which is puzzling, interesting and amusing in equal measure, is that the king was not there when he died, even if some of the administrative machinery may have been.  Theudebert’s son and successor, Theudebald held court at Metz.  With the death of Theudebald, the conveniently alliteratively-named first Austrasian dynasty came to an end, and the kingdom passed to his great uncle, Chlothar I.  Chlothar too had some connection with Trier, but as king, by this stage, of most of Gaul, he spent most time elsewhere and is mostly associated with Soissons.  When, by that time king of the whole regnum francorum, he died in 561, in the eventual division of the kingdom between his four sons, Austrasia fell to Sigibert, and Sigibert moved his court to Rheims.  By 566, however, he was holding church councils and celebrating his marriage to Brunhild at Metz, and Metz remained the principal Austrasian royal urban residence for as long as we have information on the subject. 
Thus, although the Austrasian kings flirted with the idea of establishing themselves in the old Imperial capital, their association with the city was brief and, as we’ll see, unhappy; they appear to have toyed with various other capitals, including, briefly, the other principal northern city of Roman Gaul, Rheims, but within fifty years or so had definitively settled upon Metz, and equally definitively abandoned Trier.  So pronounced was this shift that by the end of the Merovingian period Trier even lost its Metropolitan status, and the bishops of Metz briefly became archbishops.  So what had gone wrong?  Why did the Frankish kings give up on Trier?
The principal reasons are episcopal and ideological; more particularly they are Nicetius of Trier, or Nicetius of the Treveri as Gregory of Tours calls him in his Vita Patrum, which is possibly significant, as we shall see.  Nicetius, possibly of Aquitanian origin, was appointed bishop of Trier by Theuderic in about 525, and remained bishop for the next forty years or so.  When Nicetius became bishop he felt a weight settling upon his neck, which he realized was the burden of episcopal dignity.  However he may have been weighed down by the responsibilities of his office, Nicetius was never unduly burdened by doubts about his own importance.  According to Gregory, or his informant Aredius of Limoges, Nicetius’ former assistant, even before he was bishop Nicetius used to berate King Theuderic for his sinful behaviour.  In Gregory’s Life of the bishop, this was allegedly why Theuderic made him bishop.  This is rather odd, not just because it seems to be asking for trouble, but also because Theuderic usually comes across as a nasty piece of work in Gregory’s writing.  By contrast his son Theudebert is usually given a glowing write up by the bishop of Tours but in the Life of Nicetius he is the bishop’s most sinful royal adversary.  This is revealed most clearly by the showdown in the cathedral described in Gregory’s Life of the Fathers, where Nicetius excommunicated the king and his fellow debauchees.  The king refused to leave the church whereupon a possessed man proclaimed that the king was indeed a sinner and too proud, whereas the bishop was a holy and humble man, and God would decide this in due course.  After this display, the king, unsurprisingly, stalked out of the church and Nicetius healed the possessed man, although he could nowhere be found afterwards.  Many people, says Gregory, said this showed that he had been sent by the Lord.  We might wonder, perhaps too rationally, if it wasn’t just that the king’s men found him first... 
This, is possibly a good place to revisit Mark Humphreys’ theme of the provision of spectacle.  We assume that the Merovingian kings had set up in the former imperial palace.  As we have seen, this was a complex which included amphitheatre and circus but also the bishop’s cathedral.  The two were close neighbours and thus in competition for control of this vital component of the city.  What, if any, spectacles were put on in the former amphitheatre, which may have been turned into a form of stronghold in this period, or the circus, is unknown.  Childebert II staged bear-baiting in Metz, presumably in the small amphitheatre there; another Merovingian king allegedly restored the circuses at Paris and Soissons because he wanted to present spectacles to the people; Theudebert himself is said by Procopius to have staged horse races in the circus at Arles.  Whatever these games were, they appear to have been trumped by great religious spectacles, especially those which involved the dramatic humbling of  the king and miraculous healings – even if any rash ‘volunteers from the audience’ may have found themselves sleeping with the fishes shortly afterwards.  In terms of the competition of impresarios, there can be little doubt about who won here. 
And maybe it wasn’t just the bishop but the community which he had won over who presented the problems.  Theudebert had been betrothed to a Lombard princess called Wisigard but instead ran off with a Roman noblewoman from the south called Deuteria.  The Merovingians’ irregular marital practices do not generally appear to have alarmed people, other than a very small number of bold, and possibly over-self-confident, clerics.  Yet, according to Gregory, Theudebert eventually put aside Deuteria and made good his promise to Wisigard, because ‘the Franks’ thought this was, in Lewis Thorpe’s translation, a ‘scandalous situation’.  I have suggested elsewhere that this outrage may have stemmed from a resentment of the fact that the Merovingians studiously avoided intermarriage with their Frankish aristocrats.  More significantly for us, perhaps, is the fact that the next time that Gregory mentions ‘the Franks’ in the context of the reign of Theudebert, it is as the mob at Trier who stone to death Parthenius the tax collector – who must, Simon Loseby was telling me last week, have been aged about eighty at the time: he’s a grandson of the emperor Avitus.  The Franks hated Parthenius because he had taxed them during Theudebert’s reign.  Gregory hated him partly because he was a member of Avitus’ family, of whom he had no great opinion, but also, rather charmingly, because he was a great glutton and used to ‘fart in public without any consideration for those present’.  Some would say that stoning him to death was going a little far...  Some, and in this case I would include myself, would say that it was a bit churlish to kill Parthenius because of the king’s almost certainly entirely legal – if possibly more rigorous than expected – taxation policy.   
Either way, Theudebert cannot have felt that Trier, its bishop and its locals, was a welcoming place.  This was unfortunate because Theudebert was one of those Merovingians with real pretensions to Romanitas.  He minted solidi with his own image on them, much to the disgust of Procopius, sent letters to Justinian which styled himself in such a way as to compete with the Emperor in titles, and indeed to deny the Emperor his assumption of various titles, not least francicus!  There seems to be a real competitive dialogue between the two in this correspondence. He sent an embassy to Constantinople including examples of all the peoples over whom he claimed overlordship.  The Angiloi present caused merriment by falling off their horses: the awkwardness of being an Englishman in New Rome.  Theudebert led an army in the Italian wars with some success, taking advantage of both the Ostrogoths and the Byzantines: he adopted the not untypically Frankish policy of getting round the fact that he had made an alliance with both the Goths and the East Romans as King of the Franks, by initially dispatching an army of subject Burgundians and Alamans!  In Arles, as mentioned, he put on a display of horse racing in the circus, which was probably as close as he could get to an imperial display in the last capital of the Gallic prefecture.  How galling, then, if you’ll excuse the pun, that he could never make Trier his own.  Small wonder, perhaps, that he decided to move to Verdun, a small town – indeed only a civitas capital since Diocletian’s reforms – with no such grandiose pretensions. 
Not much of a surprise either that his son Theudebald who, by all account, would not have seen eye-to-eye with the morally rigorous bishop of Trier, set up shop in Metz.  Theudebald, however, reigned only a few years, whereupon the north-east passed to the formidable Chlothar I.  Even an old savage like Chlothar could not expect an easy ride from Nicetius, however.  Nicetius continued to denounce Chlothar and excommunicate him, even as the king responded by threats, eventually carried out, to send the bishop into exile.  Again there is a comment in Gregory’s Histories which possibly fleshes out the account in the Vita Patrum.  When he took over Theudebald’s kingdom – the Kingdom of Francia, as Gregory calls it, interestingly – Chlothar also took over Theudebald’s widow, Vuldetrada (who, incidentally, was the sister of the Wisigard who had been married to Theudebald’s father Theudebert: such are the labyrinthine Merovingian marital politics).  Says Gregory (or rather Lewis Thorpe) in another marvellous, if unintentionally hilarious, phrase, ‘he began to have intercourse with Vuldetrada but he stopped when the bishops complained.’  Again I think we can detect Nicetius’ role here.  As Nicetius was leaving for exile, accompanied by a sole deacon, whom we might suppose was Aredius of Limoges, messengers arrived from Chlothar’s son Sigibert saying that Chlothar had died, just as Nicetius had predicted.  Sigibert invited the bishop, by these letters, to return to his see.  Sigibert, however, made his capital at Rheims and then Metz, as we have seen.  He was astute enough to court Nicetius’ favour, but far too astute to want him as a near neighbour. 
Nicetius’ ex cathedra fulminations against the kings were not the whole story, either.  He also declared that he had had a vision in which he saw a great and many-windowed tower with God at the summit.  Through one of the windows, an angel read out from a book and declared the names of the Kings of the Franks and how long they would reign, the nature and length of their life.  Nicetius did not keep this to himself for, as Gregory says, ‘And for each king it happened just as Nicetius declared in his revelation.’  Romanists, especially late Romanists, amongst you will appreciate that this was a startlingly dangerous dream to own up to having had, let alone to keep harping on about in public.  Yet Nicetius does not appear to have been bothered by this. 
Nicetius, it must be said, took a maximalist interpretation of his pastoral responsibilities.  In 564 he wrote to Chlodosind, queen of the Lombards and daughter of his recently deceased adversary Chlothar, to enjoin her to convert her pagan husband, Alboin.  This letter gives us an interesting alternative account of Clovis’ conversion from that given by Gregory.  Nicetius also saw no problem in writing to the Emperor Justinian, accusing him of falling into the Eutychian and Nestorian heresies.  This letter is interesting largely for the fact that it shows that Nicetius had got completely the wrong end of the stick, doubtless confirming Byzantinist views of the uncouth West.  None of this, however, would prevent someone as grand as the metropolitan bishop of Belgica Prima from writing a hectoring, if ill-informed, tract to the mere ruler of the Roman Empire.  Justinian’s response is unrecorded.  What chance did a mere rex francorum have?  I think now we begin to understand the exasperation of Theudebert and Chlothar. 
Nicetius also worked as an impresario of cult.  Mark Handley has shown quite clearly how the church and the cult of SS Maximinus and Paulinus were promoted in the sixth century by Nicetius, although he also makes the interesting point that the bishop may have been building upon an existing local veneration of these saints.  Handley makes a persuasive case that the relics of Paulinus were translated to Trier before 550, during Nicetius’ long episcopate.  He also makes clear that the church and cemetery of St-Maximinus took over from that of St Eucharius as the post popular choice of burial place.  Epigraphic evidence from this cemetery underlines the growing popularity of the cults of Maximinus and Paulinus in the sixth century.  This cemetery was, as Handley demonstrates, growing in popularity by the fifth century but I think its dominance can be put down to Nicetius, who is associated with the church of Maximinus in several miracles, and in the end chose to be buried there.  The growth in popularity of the northern cemetery may be down to the fact that it was closer to the cathedral, and to the fact that occupation appears to have been concentrated in the northern part of the walled zone.  Nicetius was thus adapting to his environment. Nicetius used the cult of Maximinus in a struggle with one of his deacons.  Given that his own cult became popular too, this only strengthened the importance of this site.  We shall return shortly to consider why Nicetius should have chosen to favour Maximinus and Paulinus instead of the first bishop of Trier, Eucharius, who appears to have been venerated by some at least of Nicetius’ predecessors.  For now, the power of Nicetius over his flock is what should be stressed. 
Thus far I have dwelt upon Nicetius’ spiritual and high political activities, but it is worth drawing attention to other aspects of his work, which equally spelt difficulty for any competitors for authority in the Triererland.  In a poem addressed to Nicetius, Venantius Fortunatus dwells at length about Nicetius’ ‘castellum’ on the Mosel.  This place, called Mediolanum, is ringed by walls with thirty towers and sits overlooking the Mosel on a dominant crag.  The bishop has organized mills to grind flour, to feed his flock, and has planted vines to ensure wine.  Quite where this castellum was is not entirely clear.  If Ross Samson is right, however, rather than being a newly constructed private fortification, it was the site of a Roman castellum or burgus.  This seems to be the more common way of reading this passage and, though there is no decisive evidence, it seems plausible enough.  If so, then we see the bishop’s famed humilitas at work again.  A Roman castellum would, presumably, have been public land and thus have passed to the king.  Nicetius appears to have taken over this land and used it to his own purposes, especially providing bread and wine for the locals.  Again, this is precisely the sort of thing which, as Richard said in his paper, might undercut other attempts to create links of patronage and dependence.
The burdens of episcopal office could be considerable, as Nicetius said.  However, there was no automatic reason why a bishop should feel duty bound to be such a thorn in the side of his kings.  The Merovingian Church seems to have generally adopted a somewhat flexible approach to the demands of its rulers.  In this, as well as drawing upon traditions of having to work with possibly pagan Frankish rulers in the fifth century, after 507 it took up the baton from the Visigothic Gallic church, which had found similar theological elasticity (or, in Gregory of Tours term, ‘flattery’) to encompass close working relationships with Arian kings.  Nor, as we shall see, was it a foregone conclusion that bishops who took a more ideologically rigorous line would win out.  Theuderic wanted a saintly cleric as bishop for his capital, and apparently imported other southern Gallic clergy to staff the Trierer churches.  However, I think he expected that the bishop would be beholden to him for this, and become a yes man, or perhaps, to borrow a joke first cracked I think by Paul Kershaw a ‘yes minister’.  What was it that made Nicetius so awkward?   
Here we must return to why Nicetius chose to promote the cults of Maximinus and Paulinus, fourth-century bishops of Trier. Both had been outspoken critics of Arianism, and thus of emperors.  Gregory of Tours says that Maximinus was a powerful bishop in the reign of Constans, information possibly derived from his Trier sources.  He was a vocal supporter of the anti-Arian party.  Paulinus died in exile.  As Handley says, it seems to have been Nicetius who brought his relics back for burial in Trier, though whether it was his ill-judged letter to Justinian which facilitated this is perhaps less likely.  When he (if it was he) acquired or invented relics of Paulinus it is important to note that, unlike Kate Cooper’s Roman cult impresarios, Nicetius ‘discovered’ not a martyr, but a local bishop who had been exiled for his firm stance against worldly rulers.  Furthermore, Nicetius had an attachment to the cult of St Martin, another saint who, by the late sixth century had acquired anti-Arian credentials.  In his letter to Chlodosind, he says that it was because of miracles at the church of St Martin in Tours that Clovis was converted.  As he will have known from the highly influential Life of Martin by Sulpicius Severus, Martin was an outspoken critic of backsliding Emperors, not fearing to tackle Magnus Maximus.  And where did Martin do this, other than at Trier?  For a naturally zealous prelate like Nicetius, these traditions, in the physical environment, however run down, of the old imperial capital and palace, could indeed settle heavily upon your neck.
Nicetius was not just a problem whilst he was alive.  After his death some time in the mid 560s, his cult rapidly became very popular.  Gregory tells us, in the Glory of the Confessors of the many miracles which took place at his tomb.  These included the freeing of prisoners from their chains, so even from beyond the grave, Nicetius could present difficulties for the agents of secular law and order.  Nicetius’ cult, obviously, was promoted by his successors, and they inherited the burden of tradition, obviously even heavier for Nicetius’ sterling efforts during his forty-year episcopate.  His successor Magneric, though he does not appear to have been a particularly politically effective figure, outside Trier at any rate, nevertheless also intervened in royal efforts to control the church.  When Theodore of Marseille – an unfortunate, though, it has to be said, politically inept prelate – was brought north on one of his periodic trials, Magneric intervened on his behalf, praying for his release and putting about stories which claimed how demons had pronounced this bishop to be a holy man: the resonance with the story of Nicetius’ clash with Theudebert is fairly clear.  He also tried to save the life of Guntramn Boso but with less success.  His opponent, Childebert II, despite or because of his tender years, being only 18 or 19 at the time, had a more robust approach to dealing with difficult bishops than his relatives.  He ordered his troops to set fire to Guntramn’s house, and if Magneric didn’t come out, well, then he could go up in smoke too.  The church where Magneric prayed for the release of Theodore was the Church of Maximinus, so he too was continuing to promote this cult, now of course strengthened by having Nicetius’ remains interred there.
Difficult though the episcopal tradition at Trier was for Merovingian kings to deal with, it still is not the whole story.  Bryan Ward Perkins discussed the problems which might arise from attempting to impose a new ideology upon the built remains of a previous one, to which one was opposed.  I think Bella Sandwell’s discussion of Antioch demonstrated clearly why temples might not have been such a huge problem as Bryan supposed.  In Trier the Altbachtal cult site appears to have simply been allowed to fall down, and have private houses built all over it by the Merovingian period.  In the west, buildings associated with spectacle appear to have been more problematic, as I mentioned after Bryan’s paper and as Mark Humphreys’ paper showed much more lucidly.  In the Trier context, the diatribe of the ex-pat Treverus Salvian against his former compatriots and their hankering after circuses in the dark days of the fifth century takes on particular importance.  Here, the fact that the circus and amphitheatre lay next to the cathedral was probably a boon to Nicetius, but not to his royal rivals, as we have seen.  Yet the problem of the existing built environment did not only arise where one wished to impose a new and antagonistic ideology.  It could arise when one wanted to adopt but adapt the old ideology.  As many commentators have shown, and is increasingly the standard view, Merovingian royal ideology was very Roman, but the very fact that Trier had been the Roman capital itself made difficulties.  In his poems composed during various visits to the north-east, Venantius Fortunatus described Trier as ‘noble capital of a noble people’ and ‘the noble capital of ancient times.’  In, or perhaps amidst, an environment so clearly and so obviously imperial, how could post-Roman kings inscribe their own political identity?
Then I wonder if there was not a general case of what we might term, again using technical historical vocabulary, the post-Justinianic jitters?  Patrick Amory has demonstrated clearly the very real political importance of the new Constantinopolitan ideology about the ‘lost west’ and the need for reconquest from the 520s onwards.  These ideas were translated into bloody reality in the middle decades of the century, with the expulsion of the Vandals from Carthage and of the Ostrogoths from Italy.  Indeed mention of the Ostrogoths and the well-known buildings of Ravenna might bring up very clearly the problem of imposing new ideologies on old ones.  All this may well have made post-Roman kings, who were no less keen on Romanitas than their predecessors, somewhat less easy about inhabiting the ideological centres of the Roman Empire.  After all, that Empire had just waged dreadful war against such interlopers.  All this might help us understand why the Anglo-Saxon kings seem later to have had less of a problem with using York.  As we saw last week, there was – or seems to have been – a significant break between York’s existence as a Roman city and its reuse by the Romanising kings of Northumbria.
The jitters can be seen as late as the 580s, long after the Empire had ceased to have any real ability to interfere militarily in the west, during the Byzantine-backed revolts of Hermenegild and Gundovald.  This may well be why after the middle of the sixth century ‘barbarian’ kings stopped living in major Roman centres.  The case of the embattled Lombards, perpetually at war with the Empire is particularly unsurprising; the Visigoths, who now adopted Toledo had also been on the receiving end of Justinian’s ideology.  To this one might add that the bishops of Milan obviously had their own highly significant model of forthright intervention against secular rulers: Ambrose himself.  Roger Collins has demonstrated the problems which the Visigoths had in dealing with the bishops of Mérida.  The Visigoths also had recent problematic confrontations with Roman aristocratic groups.
All this was particularly acute for the Lombards and Visigoths, both of whom had to contend with imperially controlled territories providing rival political foci and, especially in Italy, rather more convincing claims to Roman identity.  Yet it was clearly a problem for the Franks too.  Here we return to the Treveri themselves. The priest confounded by St Maximinus in a miracle during the reign of Theudebert was called Arbogast.  It does not seem unlikely that the dynasty descended from the fourth-century usurper and fifth-century count was still present in the city and proclaiming its identity.  Arbogast’s opponent was just ‘a Frank’, another intriguing reference to ‘Franks’ in Trier in Theudebert’s reign.  More usually, however, the Treveri took a particularly Roman identity.  It is interesting to note that Gregory calls Nicetius ‘Bishop of the Treveri’ and not Bishop of Trier.  I think it does suggest his link with a particular, Romanising community.  The wealth of the Trierer aristocracy was noted at the beginning of my paper.  It is possibly demonstrated by the continuing frequent use of Roman names throughout the Merovingian period on Trier epitaphs.  It is also shown by those epitaphs themselves.  If one plots the distribution of Merovingian epitaphs in northern Gaul we have a few here, a few there, as many as twenty or so in Metz, but, at the latest count, over 800 in Trier.  Mark Handley says that this is over a third of the entire corpus of Gallic late antique inscriptions.  This was a community which proclaimed an adherence to Roman traditions in death and I would argue one which proclaims a greater confidence in status and identity.  This was going to be the competing communities part of this project, because I wanted to compare this tradition with the burial of grave-goods in the rural areas of the civitas.  There are interesting comparisons and contrasts between these forms of competitive memorialisation.  As is clear though, I don’t have time to go into this.
The comparative power of the Treveri aristocracy might also be shown by the comparatively better rate of survival of villas and other sites into the fifth century.  Largely the evidence is not very good and still only seems to go as far as the mid century, but this is still better than the areas all around – here we’re still talking about the Mosel valley rather than the peripheral regions of the civitas.  And the evidence of continued occupation at Trier itself, though hardly deafening, is better than that for certain other Gallic towns I could mention, or any British town.  Most interestingly of all is the reference in the Vita Germani Grandivallensis to the fact that Germanus came from a family of ‘senators’.  This reference to senators is, as far as I am aware, unique in Merovingian northern Gaul, and note, again, his Roman name.  Not quite as interesting, but still fairly interesting, is the Vita Gaugerici with its statement that Gaugeric came from a family of ‘Romans’ of middling status in the civitas of Trier.  Here, however, his parents gave him a Germanic name.  Another point is the survival of Roman place-names in the region and the fact, long known, that the area of Trier was a bastion of Romance language, another index of self-conscious, socio-culturally powerful Roman identity in the post-Roman world.
I wonder if the repeated reference to ‘Franks’ in Trier in Gregory’s works is suggestive.  Gregory’s sources for Trier were almost entirely to do with Nicetius, probably almost entirely Aredius of Limoges.  Nicetius probably, and Aredius certainly, were Aquitanian Romans, like the Arvernian Gregory himself.  Nicetius and Aredius possibly felt some common identity with the Roman Treveri.  Given the Roman names and collective identity of the Treveri, it may be that the stories about ‘Franks’ which made it back to Gregory were stories about ‘outsiders’.  After all, the Frank in the miracle involving the deacon Arbogast is at the end of the story simply called ‘barbarus’.
The Trierer aristocracy appears to have remained powerful and comparatively wealthy throughout the Merovingian period.  The power of the Merovingian realm was largely based upon the importance of royal patronage and office.  The Treveri do not appear to have felt they needed this, and yet were sufficiently self-assured to feel they belonged at the centre of power.  Possibly the best way to combat this and bring them to heel was to adopt the solution which bound the even more powerful and confident southern Gallic Roman aristocracies into the Merovingian polity: to remove them from the centres of politics.
With all this in mind it is perhaps easy to see why the ‘King of the Franks’ may not have felt at ease in Trier, especially after Justinian’s wars.  Thus he moved to Metz.  Brief study of Metz sheds extra light on the problem, not least because it highlights its complexities.  Metz was a large city and a prosperous one as we’ve seen, central within Austrasia and more easily defended than Trier.  It did not, furthermore, have Trier’s Roman ideological baggage.  It did have, like Toledo, the merit of absolute blandness.  This allowed the kings to proclaim their Romanitas but to inscribe their own political identity on the town.  Now, interestingly, they seem to have tried to recreate a royal complex very similar to that at Trier.  It had a centre for spectacle in the small amphitheatre, probably like that at Trier, incorporated into the walls.  It had a large basilical building, which was probably the centre of the palace complex, and it had the cathedral of St Stephen in close proximity.  But bishops weren’t a problem at Metz.  There were no awkward local saints or traditions of episcopal antagonism.  What’s more, the Merovingians, practically as soon as they moved to Metz, simply installed trusted former palatine officials as bishops.  Practically every bishop of Metz that we know anything at all about has a close link with the royal court.  The most problematic bishop, Arnulf does not appear to have been popular with the locals and seems to have been driven out.  His cult did not take off until his descendants, the Carolingians, gained political control, and it took them a while to bring Metz to heel.  The difficulties of bishops were still revealed, however.  Although the evidence is almost non-existent, it seems that Charles Martel, when he gained control of Metz, had to put up with a bishop, Sigibald, who had been a member of the opposing faction, and was clearly venerated in the region.  Sigibald inconveniently remained bishop for the rest of Charles’ period of rule.  When he died Charles’ successors quickly installed one of their followers, Chrodegang, who assiduously refounded Sigibald’s monastic foundations.
The Messin aristocracy was also less wealthy than that in neighbouring regions.  The king and the bishop would appear to have retained tight control of the lands of the Plateau Lorrain throughout the Merovingian region, and the region remained socially and politically dependent upon Metz and the patronage dispensed there.  This was much more like it.
So, post-Roman kings liked to act the Roman Emperor but they didn’t want any latter day Ambroses on their doorsteps stealing the show.  Merovingian kings liked to take role of Roman ruler; they were not keen on the supporting cast playing the part of the citizens of the res publica with too much gusto. 

Tuesday, 4 June 2013

The Crisis of the State

[Here is the paper I pre-circulated for a really interesting conference called ‘Worlds in Motion: Rome, China and the Eurasian Steppe in Late Antiquity’ held last week at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.  My great thanks to Michael Maas and Nicola di Cosmo for the invitation to attend.  For the doubtless hundreds of you who have been following this, it's the latest stage in my thinking about the issue of the state in late antiquity.  This begins with the same old same old about the decline of governmental apparatus and the rise of the aristocracy, but then moves on to address other, perhaps more subtle issues.  It comes to the same conclusion in the end, that to call western polities after 600 'states' is to rob the word state of any analytical value.  In discussion it was pointed out, possibly - probably? - rightly, that to concentrate on whether something was or wasn't a state distracts attention from important issues, but as there have been many works recently arguing that early medieval kingdoms were states, I am worried that this isn't an attempt to stifle opposition to the ... consensus.  Now read on.]

Introduction 

(I am aware that this is all very provisional and probably quite disjointed.  Some of the confusion may have righted itself in my mind by the end of May; some may not.  I crave indulgence for all that and look forward to your thoughts!  As this work stems from an on-going project, many of my references are to unpublished, unreferenced texts of lectures that I’ve posted on my blog.  Other referencing is very rudimentary but (I hope) indicative.  Apologies for those rough edges, too.)

For the last few years I have been looking at changes that took place in western Europe between the last third of the sixth century and the first half of the seventh.  This was a crucial period – as indeed it was in the eastern Mediterranean, as has long been known – but the fission of western European history into different national histories following the rupture of the unifying  grand narrative of Roman imperial history means that this change is less widely appreciated there.  Nonetheless, important change there was, recognisable in all the different regions of the West, in the different thematic types of history – economic, religious, social, religious, intellectual, military, political &c. – not only in the images that our sources present but in the forms which the evidence itself takes and in the quantitative extent and geographical spread of its survival.  

Clearly something major was going on, even if the details, the responses, and the trajectories of development were different from region to region.  A key aspect is change in the nature of political structures.  At least in the first quarter of the sixth century, perhaps the first third, up to the start of Justinian’s wars, conveniently beginning in 533, western European politics were still played out within an imperial framework – perhaps to an even greater degree than we have envisaged.

As a corollary, it is probably not surprising that government continued in recognisably Roman fashion.  For all that we are used to conceiving of them as ‘Germanic’ kingdoms in this period, it is very difficult indeed to find much that can cogently be called Germanic or even barbarian.  Certainly there were new elements in western rulership but these developed within a distinctively late imperial framework.  It is worth remembering how new kingship was and the extent to which it was being made up by political actors as they went along.  It may also be that even as late as the early sixth century it was not regarded as a permanent or even ideal solution to the problems thrown up by the fifth century, even by those occupying royal thrones.  This is not to suggest lumpen continuity of form, but a continuity of the tramlines within which change took place.  At least by the mid-seventh century, something important had changed in all of this.  

At the same time, changes occurred in the nature of social structures, most significantly with a growth in local aristocratic power.  Not unconnected to this were profound economic transformations.  Simultaneously, too, there were shifts in royal ideology and in aspects of religious life.  All these areas are closely interrelated and focus upon the interaction between central government and local power.  For those reasons I want to explore them under the rubric of the crisis of the state.  In terms of this workshop, the significance of this is that the change proposed will have little to do with the usually supposed catalysts for political change in the late antique West: the barbarian migrations and the western Empire’s political demise.  This means that it proposes a rather different chronology for change.  Traditionally, shifts in western political structures have been supposed to have occurred in the fifth century, with the migrations and the end of the Empire.  Realisation that drastic political change, as opposed to traumatic political events, did not happen then produced a counter-view of continuity across the period, perhaps right through to the Carolingian period.1  Similarly, in a Frankish context, old ideas of major transformation around the mid-eighth century with the dynastic change from Merovingians to the Carolingians have been replaced with an awareness of continuities across that divide.2  However, the idea of long-term continuity or slow evolution seems to me to be equally unsatisfactory.  I hope to demonstrate that something pretty dramatic did happen between the Fall of the West and the Rise of the Carolingians, but not when, or in the way that, we have been used to thinking.

There will be a weak and a strong thesis to this paper.  The weak thesis is that a crisis of the state occurred around 600; that changes took place which compelled a real shake up in the ways in which central and local power interacted, a critical moment which, whether or not it did, at least could have produced a breakdown of the state.  A supplementary to the weak thesis is that these changes killed off the ‘Roman World’ that is still so visible in, say, 525-30.3  One might entitle this ‘weak thesis’ ‘the end of the late antique state in the West’.  The ‘strong thesis’ is that the result of these changes was the end of political formations that can usefully be analysed as states in any way.  With a slight but important change in the word order, the strong thesis can be entitled ‘the end of the state in the late antique West’.

Theory (1)

Marxist and non-Marxist, Weberian definitions of a state converge on key issues.  Two examples from consciously opposed theoretical camps may serve to prove this.  First of all, Michael Mann:

The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards to cover a territorially demarcated area, over which it claims a monopoly of binding and permanent rule-making, backed up by physical violence.4

Mann, of course, also argued that a state had to control all four of his sources of social power: ideological, economic, military and political.  He also, interestingly, completely skipped over the period that concerns me today.  Indeed, as far as I can see the whole 5-600 years of the early middle ages constitute the only era of recorded human political history in Europe that he did skip.  Nevertheless, he does say that some post-imperial states existed but that they were small and short-lived.5  I contend that he is wrong on both of these counts, certainly for the period before 600, less so thereafter.

Secondly, John Haldon’s, from The State and the Tributary Mode of Production, a Marxist work written explicitly to counter Mann’s modified Weberianism:

[A state is] ‘a set of institutions and personnel concentrated spatially at a single point and exerting authority over a territorially distinct area.6

To take a third example, Chris Wickham’s definition of the state turns on five things: 7 
  1. The centralization of legitimate enforceable authority (justice and the army)
  2. The specialisation of governmental roles with an official hierarchy which outlasted the people who held official position at any one time;
  3. The concept of public power …;
  4. Independent and stable resources for rulers;5. A class-based system of surplus-extraction and stratification

This might broadly be acceptable as a definition.  Such a definition tallies reasonably well with those of other thinkers, including those who work on the middle ages, such as Susan Reynolds.8  It is broad enough to encompass a range of state forms, but also strict enough to rule out other forms of complex political organisation.  Yet, if the definitions given by Mann, Haldon and Wickham are uncontroversial, they apply badly to western Europe after c.600, as I hope to demonstrate.  

More recent work on putative early medieval states has moved too far in the opposite direction.  The success of early medieval regimes in ensuring that local holders of power bought into their legitimacy surely produced politically coherent kingdoms or polities (to use more descriptively neutral terminology) but a politically coherent polity, I would contend, is not necessarily a state.9  Nor is the eternal retreat of the term down the political chain of command – to lordships, logically, I suppose, ultimately to Germanic Hausherrschaft or Roman patria potestas – a solution.  The fashionable consensus view of medieval politics suffers from many problems, not least a lack of any sophisticated analysis of the reactionary and repressive work that the word consensus does, then and now.10  This cosily politically-conservative view simultaneously negates the violence involved in lordship and the violent competition that is all-too-visible in royal and aristocratic politics.  Ironically, although this view glosses over ideological implications of the word consensus it fails to address the actual weakness of political centre; it fails to see that the extent of negotiation involved in dealing with local power circuits speaks of a degree of governmental weakness that surely prevents any analytically apt use of the term state to describe early medieval kingdoms.  

There is also a simple materialist, economic point to make in the context of the early middle ages and that is that surplus and the means of generating it were finite.  Surplus came overwhelmingly from the land, generated by the finite resource of human and animal muscle power.  Land was finite, obviously, and technologies for making economically marginal landscapes agriculturally productive did not yet exist.  Nor did means of improving the agricultural yield of estates, even if yields may not always have been as knife’s-edge as we have often thought.11  The economy was largely non-monetary, keying rewards for political and other service and the means by which elite status was maintained to the produce of designated lands.  Commerce was small-scale, overall and there was no system of banking or state credit.  Thus in some sense the grant of surplus from one person or institution to another did in some sense mean the loss of some part of the basis of power and its transfer to someone else.  In this sense the old ‘zero-sum’ idea of the relationship between rulers and aristocrats has some fundamental merit and this is why the nature of such transfers and the articulation of the extraction of surplus are the location for so much of the dynamics of early medieval political change.12  The first area of change I want briefly to describe thus concerns the demise of what might be termed state apparatus and the growth of the power of the local aristocracy.

Evidence for Change (1): The Efficiency of State Apparatus

Some words on regional variation

In describing the changes that took place across the last third of the sixth century and the first half of the seventh I focus on Gaul/Francia, the area I know best.  There were of course important differences in detail from one area to another, which I cannot do justice to in the space available, even where I am aware of them!  At a higher level of analysis, though, it is also clear that trajectories of change were not identical everywhere.  

The essential outlines seem similar in England and in northern Gaul.  There are important similarities in Spain too although much remains to be clarified.  (I hope that I may have been able to clarify my own thoughts a little more by the time of the workshop…)  The traditional debate has been over the supposed weakness of the later Visigothic kingdom, an image that ought to fit the general outlines of the thesis I am proposing.  Nonetheless thirty years ago Roger Collins put forward a very convincing counter argument that seventh-century Spain should be regarded as a strong and centralised kingdom.  It may be that the local power and independence of the later Visigothic aristocracy was rather less impressive than we think and thus the dynamic of their relationship with the royal court somewhat different from what is often envisaged.  Similarly, in Lombard Italy something of a rethink of traditional ideas may be necessary.  By the eighth century the Lombards had created an impressively centralised kingdom in Italy but it is difficult to project this image confidently back to the late sixth or the start of the seventh.  The written evidence upon which it is based is almost entirely eighth-century.  Most of the seventh century lacks decent documentary records and – as in Spain – the archaeological data may paint a picture that is rather different.  

A strong possibility at a macro scale, therefore, is that there was a different trajectory of development in southern and northern Europe.  Through much of the sixth century, patterns of trade around the Mediterranean, however they may have declined in scale, remained broadly within a late Roman framework; certainly there was more long-distance commerce than is visible in the north-west of Europe at that time, and the exchange network reached round as far as the eastern shores of the Irish Sea.  Economic changes around 600 produced a change in patterns and a decline in the Mediterranean system, while long-distance trade and economy revived around the North Sea.  Those economic shifts might well be an important part of any explanation for different socio-political trajectories in north and south.  Although real economic decline in the Mediterranean seems to me only really to set in, and the contrast between North Sea and Mediterranean economies to become starkest, rather later, at the end of the seventh century, the seeds of that change may belong to my period.13

Another interesting development in the northern area is a break-down in the differences between regions that had once formed a part of the Roman Empire and those which had not.  Ironically this may be related to ideas about the end of the Roman world and the analogous effects this had on regions inside and outside the old limes.14  This is a point that has emerged as the result of some research into what is now Scotland, and the development of Pictish society and politics.15  One way in which the old differences were eroded is in the survival of evidence.  In the sixth century, large swathes of former barbaricum lack diagnostic archaeological evidence as well as written sources.  In the seventh, this changes dramatically.  Here, then, it might be that the general outlines of social and political development were more similar to those in my geographically and analytically central case-study of Gaul.

‘State Apparatus’

There might be something of a chicken-and-egg relationship between the growth of aristocratic power and the decline of the old state apparatus but I will talk about the latter first and then move on to other evidence for the increase in aristocratic authority in the localities.

First, tax.  How sixth-century tax was levied is a difficult matter.  Much of the West, especially north of the Loire, was effectively non-monetary; everywhere north of the Pyrenees, outside Marseille, lacked small denomination currency.  A regular standing army and large central bureaucracy, the recipients of much of the late imperial government’s taxation in money or in kind, no longer existed.16  In a fifth- and sixth-century context, though, the point of taxation may have been less about revenue than about patronage.  That is to say that most tax remained in the areas where it was levied, as a salary for royal officers there.  Whatever was levied as bullion, possibly in the form of old coins, might have been passed on to the centre.   Nonetheless, the fact was that, however revenue was raised and whatever it was used for, post-imperial governments taxed.  That is crystal clear from the sources, which not only mention taxes and revolts against raises in the tax-rate or what was held to be against unjust taxation, but also refer to tax-lists.  It has also long been known that some late Roman taxes have lineal descendants in the dues levied by the lords of ninth-century estates.  Other – lesser – duties and obligations that the king could still call upon, at least in theory, at that date also seem to derive from late imperial taxation.  In 1982, Walter Goffart proposed that, as the lords had long since appropriated the more important revenues, immunities from these minor revenues and obligations were all that was left to ninth-century kings to reward their followers.  Goffart has subsequently adopted a more extreme position, whereby all late Roman taxation continued without a break into the ninth century.17  This aligns him with French historians like Elisabeth Magnou-Nortier and Jean Durliat but the argument for extreme fiscal continuity remains a minority position.  

Goffart’s 1982 argument was more persuasive, especially in its contestation that taxation itself withered around 600 in Gaul.  If there was any post-imperial taxation in Britain, and there’s really no good reason to suppose that there wasn’t (other than the silence of the documentary record, a record so nearly non-existant that it is silent about just about everything), then similarly, by the time one gets to the earliest surviving written data, forms of revenue have clearly followed the same path, with more or less the same survivals, as in Gaul.  In the earlier seventh century, references begin to immunities, into which royal officers could not enter to collect whatever dues remained to the fisc.18  The same seems to be true in the north of Italy in the Lombard kingdom, although we could hardly claim to be well-served by relevant evidence.  Paul the Deacon’s story about the distribution of the northern Italian Roman population among the Lombards as tributarii might be an index that taxation was still in operation or it could be a sign that Italy was already seeing a development in the nature of military service that is better documented in Gaul very slightly later.19  Given the political circumstances, the latter may well be preferable.  The fate of taxation in Spain by the seventh century is an area where I need to do more research.  Explaining this change means dealing with more than the practical difficulties of collecting revenue in kind, especially given that taxation appears to have withered precisely when something of an economic revival took place in north-western Europe, including the reintroduction of coinage.  

Another crucial factor, well evidenced in all areas under discussion, is the spread of a political/ethnic identity hitherto associated with military service and at least partial tax-exemption, to more or less complete equivalence with legal free status.  By this I mean Frankish identity in northern Gaul, Gothic in Spain, Lombard in northern Italy and English in lowland Britain.  The issue of identity is one to which I shall return.

The allusion to military service brings us to another principal means by which late antique states impinged on the lives of their subjects, enabling a central government to ensure that its authority penetrated local communities.20  The standing army withered in western Europe in the fifth century, at least in its usually understood, Roman, form.  Nevertheless, that being said, later fifth- and sixth-century armed forces had clearly developed from the last imperial armies.  As just intimated, they were founded around the levying of a group of privileged freemen whose status was probably inherited, or inheritable, and based on a real, or claimed, ‘barbarian’ ethnicity.  This situation pertains in almost all of the areas where we have clear written evidence and probably applied in those where we don’t, if one can extrapolate from the symbolism of artefacts placed with the male dead in areas like Anglo-Saxon England.  As far as one can tell (in the areas with written evidence), these individuals were called out within administrative districts, civitates and commanded by royal officials.  Because of the importance of their patronage and the access to power that military service provided, Kings continued to be able to use these armies as independent coercive forces against recalcitrant aristocrats and other rebels.  

As far as the Frankish kingdoms are concerned this means of raising an army had more or less completely eroded by the mid-seventh century.  By that date it seems clear that armies were being raised from aristocrats and their clienteles.  Instead of being described as drawn from particular administrative units, civitates, the elements of Frankish armies start being described as scarae – shearings off – and the implication seems to be that although the idea of military service as a general obligation had far from disappeared, it was now heavily moderated by ties of dependence and lordship.  A description of an army campaigning in Burgundy about a century later sums up the new situation ‘a multitude of magnates and a great band of their followers’.21  A similar process towards an army with aristocratic retinues has been identified in Gothic Spain and at this date Anglo-Saxon armies seem to be broadly similar.22  Indeed the military history of Anglo-Saxon England runs along a very similar course to that of early medieval Francia.  The heads of these bands do not command simply by virtue of royal office, as had been the case in the sixth century, but from their socio-economic standing.

At about this time, the immunities alluded to earlier are much more frequently documented, in forms that apply to aristocratic or church estates.  Kings envisaged areas into which their officers could not enter unbidden, either to collect revenue or, it would seem from the inclusion of the haribann in the list of things they weren’t allowed to collect, enforce military service.

The last area of state apparatus that I want briefly to discuss is the law.  Obviously, the Roman state had applied its law universally by means of its appointed officers, even while admitting the private jurisdiction of fathers, slave-owners and other lords over certain types of tenants, while admitting the jurisdiction of army courts and while syphoning off some classes of case to ecclesiastical courts.  The same system persisted through the sixth century, although episcopal courts may have broadened their competence and (in some areas) military jurisdiction morphed into the class of laws dealing with relationships between ‘Romans’ and ‘barbarians’.  Generally speaking, the state administered the law through its counts, centenarii and so on, with provision for appeals from one level of court to the next, possibly as far as the king himself.  The legal category of lèse majesté remained to create what we might consider as a ‘state of exception’.

Obviously the law has never applied – and still does never apply – evenly across all of the classes of a polity, whatever the theory may have dictated.  It was a commonplace under Rome that the rich man could buy himself all sorts of judicial rulings and influence court decisions where his interests were concerned.  Plus ça change…  Nonetheless it is interesting that seventh-century law shows a much greater concern with attempts by aristocrats to interpose themselves between the officers of the court and the cases they were trying.  Visigothic law mentions the disruption of court proceedings with various forms of ‘tumult’, sometimes specified to be carried out by the powerful patrons of one or other litigant.23  Frankish laws make special provision for the trial of a freeman in obsequio to another freeman (a relationship, by the way, not even recognised in sixth-century legislation) apparently aimed at preventing more powerful ingenui from sheltering their followers from the law.24  These may be no more than differences of nuance from earlier situations, if that.  Nevertheless they seem to point towards broader and more significant trends.  Again, the creation of immunities is very significant.  There were now formally-recognised gaps in the coverage of the law of the realm, no-fly zones, spaces where the royal writ did not run.  This seems to me to be something much more significant than a simple extension of patria potestas or Hausherrschaft.  If one is looking for the basis of what I am increasingly coming to think of the unworked, federalist nature of early medieval politics, it is probably to be sought in the immunity.

By way of concluding this section, one can argue that the aristocracy, had managed to position itself between the kings or the central government and the local population, in the extraction of surplus, the raising of armed forces and frequently the operation of the law.   It is clear that this did not affect the cohesion – or at least the basic unity – of the western kingdoms, north or south of the Pyrenees, for different reasons, but it does equally make it clear that there was a marked decrease in the ability of whoever controlled the centre of the realm to enforce his writ in the locales of the kingdom.  This decrease is marked in the actual institutions of the kingdom, not simply a contingent, practical difficulty.  Many states go through phases where their ability to make their writ run is seriously compromised, but without the formal apparatus of government changing.  

Aristocratic power

Again, my comments will focus on Gaul but, although this is not a generally-held view, I am increasingly of the opinion that the same general development took place in Britain and elsewhere in the north-west, inside and outside the former imperial limes.  These changes focus upon a tightening or intensification of local power networks.  As before, Spain remains a difficult region to categorise although some issues of the Italian situation may be less problematic.  In the latter area the direction of change could very well be quite the opposite of that in Gaul.

That there was an increase in the authority of local and regional aristocrats in northern Gaul around 600 is difficult to gainsay.  I have long argued for the point of view that sees the northern Gallic or Frankish aristocracy as essentially a service aristocracy without local bases of power that securely confirmed them in their élite status and allowed the transfer of the latter from one generation to another, independently of an association with the Merovingian state.  Written sources and various forms of archaeological data converge to give this impression.  Historiographically, this has long been a matter of debate and opinion remains divided.  There is no space to go into the details here.25  What matters is that there was a significant change around 600 (which one would have to concede whether or not one accepted my interpretation of it).  Legal evidence and changes in the archaeological record make clear the existence of a more stratified society with a more secure control over local surplus by the aristocracy.26  Other written (and some archaeological) sources suggest that this aristocracy was able to project its power more confidently into the future, to evade local legal custom and separate itself from the community in matters of burial.  The evidence for an economic upsurge and a revival of urban sites in this period underlines this, as – obviously – do the ways by which the aristocracy was able to interpose itself between the operation of the central government and the power circuits of local society.  Central to this change, as I have argued previously,27 was a change in the means by which surplus was articulated to support the position of the dominant class.  This is a change – in Wickham’s terms – from tax-based power to land-based, although it should be noted that my chronology for this change differs from his.  The relative local power of the southern Gallic – Aquitanian – nobility does not seems to have changed as drastically, although its relationship to central government may have shifted importantly in some of the same ways, as I will suggest further below.

In Anglo-Saxon England, the absence of fifth-and sixth-century written data makes precise discussion of the transformation difficult, but the archaeological record shows considerable similarities with that in northern Gaul and the documents that emerge in the course of the seventh century suggest that the changes brought analogous results to those in Francia.  The standard view of the period has tended to envisage the appearance of kingship in this period, but the evidence for such a supposition is weak and marred by too insular a focus.  It is as likely that what the decades around 600 witnessed was the fragmentation of larger political units into smaller, more intensive lordships.  In England some of these became known as kingdoms but their relationship to a larger political arena does seem to have remained.28  In northern Britain, changes in the archaeological record around 600 have also frequently been ascribed to a growth in the Pictish kingdom, a step on a road to a ‘Pictish state’, but again the material might rather reflect a shift from extensive kingdoms to smaller more intensively governed political units.29  Widespread changes well-documented in Ireland at about the same time might represent the final working through of a similar process.30

As noted, the nature of the Spanish aristocracy is less clear than we might have thought.  Wickham correctly pointed out the disjunction between the impression of wealth that one might obtain from the written sources and the rather different picture painted by the material cultural record.31  He also plausibly drew attention to some possibly misleading terminology in Spanish documents.  Spanish villas do not seem to have survived much beyond the start of the sixth century and it may be that communities became more closely grouped around churches which in turn were new foci for aristocratic display and authority.  It would nevertheless appear that aristocrats remained closely bound to their communities.32  An apparent spread of the, admittedly muted, custom of furnished burial might suggest that displays of status to local society were important in transmitting status from one generation to the next.  The difference between sixth- and seventh-century distribution of grave-goods burial might, however, be skewed by a concentration in the former period upon burials supposed to mark Gothic settlement.  Grave-goods burials without such material culture are more widespread across the peninsula.  Provisionally, I propose the fairly anodyne conclusion that the seventh-century Spanish aristocracy was significantly different in nature from its fifth- and possibly sixth-century precursors.  Its relative wealth and independence are difficult to establish but the sources suggest a number of analogous changes, during the seventh century, to those occurring in Francia.  The impossibility of hammering the Spanish situation into a neat framework of relative growth and decline may be a good way of introducing my second area of analysis.  Nonetheless, to conclude this first section, the evidence seems fairly clear that the ability of seventh-century governments across to the West to penetrate local society in order to extract surplus, maintain a coercive force and ensure that its writ ran was significantly curtailed by comparison with the sixth century.

Theory (2)

In a purely Gallic context my explanation long focused more or less exclusively upon the issues just discussed: competition for resources and authority between (to put it crudely) kings and their aristocrats, with the aristocrats winning out.  The catalyst for the change was the series of royal minorities in Gaul that began in 575.33  There might yet, descriptively, be something in this but the idea has more recently seemed to me to be inadequate.  Why should a loosening of the royal grip on patronage etc. automatically have led not only to aristocrats rushing to establish themselves more securely (which might seem reasonable) but also to changing their relationship with central authority so that the former operated less efficiently than before?  Roman aristocrats had been incredibly powerful without feeling the need for this sort of conflict or competition with the state.  My analysis began to shift towards a more ideological focus, to concentrate – again to borrow a phrase from Wickham – on how ‘the state lost consent’.34  Probably not coincidentally that led me to think more about Gramscian ideas of hegemony and the differences between political and civil society, ideology and so on.35  Ultimately that produced a greater concern to link material change to transformations in ideas.36    

The problem I encountered is well summed up by Mike Braddick in his discussion of the early modern English state.37  An emphasis on central power and force tends to play down the reality of states in much of history.  Central power inter-relates with other circuits.   It is this interaction that is crucial.  This is what recent work on the putative early medieval state has stressed but, to my mind, drawn unconvincing conclusions from.38  The issues remain of the degree to which local power circuits rely upon the central government for their articulation and functioning and the extent to which the central authority can over-ride local powers to impose its will.  This relationship is, of course, dynamic.  In the final analysis force is crucial39 but a concentration upon it is potentially misleading, as Braddick notes.  A state that must routinely employ force to ensure that its writ runs would today be classed as ‘failing’.  On the other hand, a state may not be able to employ its coercive force because of political difficulties, without ceasing to be a state.  If an army stands aside in the face of a political coup, or joins the rebels, we may witness failure a régime’s failure but not the end of a state, unless the institutions governing the army’s existence collapse with it.  This point has been central to numerous analyses, such as Althusser’s.40  

We must, therefore, not simply discuss changes in what one might think of as the ‘headline’ issues of state authority – fiscal imposts, military service, the operation of the law – but to look at more subtle, but perhaps also more important areas of interaction between the local and the central.  We must explore a slightly different range of issues, including many of those which have been, rightly, discussed by those recently wanting to adopt the terminology of the state as valuable for early medieval history.  These will include the spatial nodes of political action and their relationship to the government, office and of the legitimacy of local authority, political subjectivity and the character of the political community.  In all of these areas, I propose a major shift between the sixth and the seventh century which greatly changes how we might use the term ‘state’.  Indeed I contend that they make the term inappropriate.  The discussion has a certain contemporary resonance with what Rancière has described as the retreat of the political.41  The British Conservative Party has wedded itself to a process of replacing ‘the Big State’ with ‘the Big Society’ (no one quite knows what this means; essentially it is a form of post-industrial feudalism…).

Most of the issues mentioned above are fairly self-explanatory.  The last two, however, may require a little more by way of introduction.  By political subjectivity I mean the ways in which a socio-political actor is formed.  What (if any) part does the state play in the formation of the subject?  Closely related to this issue is that of the nature of the political community.  The existence of community has seemed enough to some analysts to justify the validity of the concept of the state.  However, as with the related term consensus this requires closer scrutiny.  In this context I will employ some thinking by Jean-Luc Nancy in his joint work (with Christophe Bailly) La Comparution and his La Communauté Désoeuvrée.42  I am not going to use this in any direct way, for many reasons.  It emerged in the aftermath of communism’s collapse in the context of the question of what the Left could retain of the communist project, and how.  Nonetheless, I will employ some issues arising from this discussion as a springboard to opening up some areas of debate apparently foreclosed by current discussions.  

One point of contact – one that increasingly strikes me as an important and fruitful line of investigation – is the renegotiation of terms of community in a period when long-standing bases for such have been swept away.  Another is the opening up and exploration of the interstices between consensus, integration and assimilation (politically-laden terms) and communal identity, and competition, coercion and alterity.  What attracts me in Nancy’s work is the deconstructive move involved in his notion of désoeuvrement, the opening of a space for an understanding of community in difference, community that is not the object of a work.  I am not going to push any of the ‘respect for the other’ that comes with Nancy’s comparution, even if there is use to be made of this.  The idea of political community not based around overarching identity or collectivity or perhaps even hegemony in the Gramscian sense, but on more contingent constellations of social and political actors, might bear exploration.  The attempts to create overriding identities to unite political communities is another dynamic of medieval political action.

Evidence of Change (2)

The spaces of the political

In the Empire and the post-imperial sixth century, the areas in which politics was enacted were places connected with the state, the imperial or royal court (or courts), the cities and other administrative nodes of the realm, peripatetic courts of presided over by royal officers, the army: unproblematically public spaces.  The cities and the lesser administrative centres (the vici, castra and castella) were the location for competitive aristocratic displays.  The episcopal network was, largely, based upon that of the administration of the late Roman Empire, as is well known.  Most church foundation in this period took place in the cities and smaller towns.  Estate churches were known but even monasticism was predominantly (not exclusively) an urban phenomenon.  Bishops fought hard (if not always very successfully) to preserve their prerogatives in the areas of preaching, baptism and so on.  The overwhelming majority of Christian cults were focused upon the cities, dominated by the bishops.  Rural cults, such as that of Saint Julian of Brioude were still intimately connected to the bishops and their cities (in this case Clermont).  Thus it is unsurprising that, outside the royal court/s, cities were the principal focus of politics.  Kings strove to maintain their ability to control these spaces, or their bishops.  Remember the famous complaint attributed (albeit problematically) to Chilperic I by Gregory of Tours, that all authority had passed to the bishops in their cities.43  This seems true of all formerly imperial areas.  Britain is usually cited as an exception but it is worth noting that we suffer from an absolute dearth of relevant evidence.  Roman cities could still have served as the foci for politics.  Canterbury, for example, appears to have been a royal centre at the end of the sixth century and York is attested in a similar role a generation or so later.  The high-status occupation of the baths basilica at Wroxeter in the post-imperial era hints at similar processes.   In the non-urbanised areas beyond the former limes it is difficult to draw any conclusions.  Comparing the distribution and nature of fortified centres north of the Antonine Wall, however, where fortified centres occupied are fewer and larger at first and then, around 600 become more numerous but smaller, possibly suggests that politics were largely enacted at the major centres of large kingdoms.  

A radical change in this pattern occurs around 600.  In various areas of the north-west, high-status rural sites appear.  Many of these focus on large halls, the political nature of which is well known from all sorts of early medieval literature.  More importantly, the seventh century, across the west, is the great moment of the foundation of rural churches and monasteries – from Ireland, via England and Francia, to Spain and Italy.  This is closely bound up with the processes we have encountered already, not least the creation of immunities and the increasing security of control over land.  The use of monastic foundations to cement local power and authority, to evade the demands of custom and the law, is attested all over Christian western Europe.  As is well known, familial rural monasteries became the political nodes of seventh-century Francia.44  The royal courts, naturally, remained crucial foci for political action and towns continued to play a role; indeed in the north-west this was a period which saw them begin to revive after perhaps three centuries of stagnation and decline.45  The extent to which they were political rather than economic foci might, however, be questioned.  The earliest northern Gallic charters do not suggest that towns were commonly used for the sorts of gathering that discussed transactions like land grants and so on.  For these, rural churches and monasteries or the centres of estates were more common, and that is even true of royal charters.  That is of true of England too, though the lack of earlier evidence makes it impossible to assess the extent to which this represented a change.  One might, then, suggest that, spatially at least, the circuits of local power ran through networks that were based upon the private – local aristocratic families, their lands, churches and other foundations – more than upon the public, administrative centres of the preceding era.

Identity and subjectivisation

It is absolutely crucial to consider the state’s role (if it had one) in the formation of social and political subjects.  Were identities related to, and formed by, a relationship with the state?  Two key areas are gender and ethnicity.

Gender

The Roman Empire had been a heavily gendered edifice.46  The very concept of masculinity had been, via its oppositions to barbarism as well as to the feminine, tied to the notion of being Roman.  What made a man superior to woman (or animal or barbarian) was also what made Roman government superior to that of the nations round-about.  The model of civic masculinity was, at least at the level of the social élites, tied into participation in government.  The idea that one was not suitable to govern also implied an inability to govern oneself and family (and vice versa) and called one’s masculinity into question.  I have argued that in the fourth century a rival, ‘martial’ model emerged in the Roman army, often in self-conscious opposition to traditional civic masculinity, stressing ferocity and other normally un-Roman characteristics.  What, however, legitimised and indeed permitted this model was its connection with the imperial government and especially the emperor.47  This has a close relationship with ideas of ethnicity in the immediately post-imperial era, to which I shall return in a moment.  The martial model steadily gained over the civic from the fifth century onwards but seems to have decisively won out – apparently quite suddenly – in the decades around 600.  

By the seventh century, outside the church, the warrior was the only real lifestyle choice open to the western aristocratic male.  I suspect that that comparatively sudden swing stemmed from the end of the possibility of relating both models to an involvement in a Roman (or sub-Roman) state, the situation that had held the two in relationship (or a dynamic tension) to each other.  I’ve previously discussed sixth-century gender as a curious moment wherein there were two poles of gendered social organisation arranged with reference to a shared, vanishing centre.48 The seventh sees (in my view) gendered restructured around a single masculine with femininity discussed with reference to its proximity to or distance from that.  Stress appears to be laid on male heads of families, a conclusion possibly supported by material cultural change as well as in the documentary record.  [An important variation here, however, might be suggested by some changes in later seventh-century Anglo-Saxon burials, with an emphasis on lavishly furnished female graves.]  It seems to me that the construction of masculinity no longer had any relationship to a function, position in or relationship to any particular political unit.  This point might be underlined with reference to the development of ethnic identity.

Ethnicity

There was a well-known functional aspect to late Roman and immediately post-imperial ethnic identity, as already alluded to.  Romans paid tax and staffed the civil bureaucracy and Church; barbarians served in the army.  This can be seen clearly in sixth-century naming practices.49  The point underlines the linkage of identity to a place or role within the functioning of the state and indeed the construction of masculinity, as in the immediately post-imperial era, references to barbarian ethnic identities in relation to women seem very few.50  

There were numerous reasons for the spread of non-Roman identity in the later sixth century: legal privilege, tax exemption, and so on.  I suspect, too, that after the wars of Justinian Roman identity might have lost much of its political value.51  This is associated with the demise of the civic model of masculinity.  By the time that Lex Ribvaria was issued, all Romani had to have a Ripuarian (Frankish) freeman speak for them at law.  The category had gone from being a parallel free society to being a class of the semi-free.52  By the seventh century this sort of ethnic change was general in the west, as mentioned already.53

This change was closely linked to that in the raising of armies, which could no longer be carried out practically on the basis of barbarian identity.54  As noted, the process now took place ‘vertically’ down chains of dependence.  This itself meant that the role of military service in subject-formation was now frequently related to ties of personal dependence or allegiance rather than a role in the state.  I suspect that change in ethnicity worked simultaneously in opposing ways.  On the one hand, non-Roman identity was now so widespread among the free population that it could no longer serve to delineate successfully a particular socio-political group with a particular relationship to the government of the realm.  On the other, presumably connected to the fact that it was now shared by women and children and clearly inherited rather than achieved (as it might have been earlier), it was now personal, so that an individual (of a particular status at least) was able to claim the personality of the law.55  There was thus no necessary relationship between ethnicity and the polity or a function within it.  [All this – and much else – would be very different in eighth-century Lombard Italy but as I said earlier, the grounds for back-projecting such a picture to the early seventh or late sixth centuries are slim, and the eighth-century Lombard kingdom – state? – might have been a comparatively recent development.]

The one area where there was no such change (as yet) was southern Gaul, Aquitaine.  Yet that area may reveal what seem to be more general tendencies.  The sixth-century Merovingian state had operated in such a way that regional élites travelled to the north of Gaul to the courts of the Merovingian kings.  The kings themselves, although they travelled around, did so within a comparatively tight circuit (certainly by comparison with their better documented eighth- and ninth-century Carolingian successors) in the Paris basin.  They rarely strayed beyond this, with the exception of Guntramn of Burgundy’s occasional forays in the northern Rhone valley and Austrasian kings’ visits to the Rhine.  Seventh-century Frankish politics show an important shift, as regional élites increasingly demand a more locally-present ruler.  This is not the case in Spain, importantly, although developments in Septimania later in the century might have had analogous roots and the large, evidently semi-autonomous region controlled by Tudmir in the early eighth century could point a similar way.56  It is possible that similar tendencies might have lain behind the appearance of smaller realms in England57 and the drift out of effective Frankish hegemony of the regions right of the Rhine.  A similar evolution possibly took place in northern Britain.58

The political community

Thus, all in all it seems to me that the political had retreated from the public sphere of the state to the private sphere of the interaction of aristocratic families and their adherents.  This is not in any way to deny the fact that this interaction was still played out for the control of, and actions legitimised by a connection with, the royal court.  This ensured that the seventh-century kingdom continued to be a coherent structure.  Yet that kingdom seems not to be a political community, or it is not the working out of community.  Identity appears centred upon family and upon features unconnected with the realm: ethnicity, perhaps, and religion.  It may be this that enhanced the attempts to create community through marriage alliances.  Even here, though, the great aristocratic clans beloved of earlier generations of historians seem to be historiographical creations rather than necessarily effective political structures.  Contingency is the watchword of a seventh-century politics dominated by shifting alliances of aristocratic groups.  In Francia and elsewhere, the political community is ‘unworked’ in Nancy’s terms.  There is no over-riding shared identity that shapes it, or which it produces.  This may even be true in Spain, and marked by the on-going (yet ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to clothe the kingship in Christian and other legitimising ritual.  Deconstruction of the notion of community thus offers us a way of comparing developments in different areas without being side-tracked by ideas of coercion, taxation and so on.

Interpretation and conclusion

In considering what produced these shifts, my thinking has come to converge upon the importance of the wars of the mid-sixth century, Justinian’s ideology of reconquest and the fall-out from that for westerners.  There’s no space to discuss this in detail, but – in brief – one of the most important effects of Justinian’s wars was surely to bring home to anyone in the west that they no longer lived in the Roman Empire.  The emperor had made it very clear that their lands had been lost to the Empire and needed reconquering, and had waged long, bloody, destructive warfare in an attempt to do so.  The bases of all sorts of identities and authority – centuries-old patterns of thought based around traditional, Roman sources of power, ideology, and behaviour – were cut away, potentially projecting the West into a sort of semiological hyperspace.  It is no coincidence that – as has long been known – the late sixth and seventh century saw an important move from traditional classical to biblical, especially Old Testament exemplars.59  That in turn underpins all sorts of other changes, encompassed in my discussion.  For people accustomed, after three hundred years or more, to the idea that the Roman Empire was commensurate with the sixth age, the awareness of living after Rome understandably produced considerable anxieties.  This conjuncture of circumstances produced, or enabled, a springing apart of old identities and communities and their reconfiguring in forms that may have been entirely contingent and expected only to be short-lived, but which turned out to be a blueprint for medieval politics.

Notes

1 The various volumes of the Transformation of the Roman World project, published by Brill in the late 1990s and early 2000s were diverse in approach but it’s not unfair to say that many contributions advocated this sort of continuity approach.  See also, A.M. Cameron, The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity.

2 Cp. P.J. Fouracre, Francia in the Age of Charles Martel.

3 Here there may be some points of contact with J.J. O’Donnell, The Ruin of the Roman Empire.

4 M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol.1, p.37.

5 Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol.1, p.390.

6 J. Haldon, The State and the Tributary Mode of Production, pp.32-33

7 C.J. Wickham, The Framing the Early Middle Ages

8 S. Reynolds, ‘The historiography of the medieval state’, in M. Bentley (ed.) The Routledge Companion to Historiography.

9 S. Airlie & W. Pohl (ed.) Staat im frühen Mittelalter.

10 E.g., above all, the oeuvre of Janet L. Nelson, e.g. Politics and Ritual in Early Medieval Europe; ead., The Frankish World.

11 I am grateful to Dr Jonathan Jarrett for advice on this point.

12 For critique of the zero sum model see T. Reuter & C.J. Wickham, ‘Introduction’ in W. Davies & P.J. Fouracre (ed), Property and Power in the Early Middle Ages.

13 E.g.. the chapters by S.T. Loseby & S. Lebeq in P. Fouracre (ed.) The New Cambridge Medieval History 1.

14 This point is discussed further at the end of this essay.

15 See below, n.29.

16 See, e.g. C.J. Wickham, The Framing of the Early Middle Ages.

17 W. Goffart, ‘Old and new in Merovingian taxation’, Past and Present 1982; cp. id. ‘Frankish military duty and the fate of Roman taxation’ EME 2008.

18 B. Rosenwein, Negotiating Space. Power, Restraint and Privileges of Immunity in Early Medieval Europe (Manchester, 1999).

19 Paul, HL, 2.32

20 Details of the changes in military organisation in this period can be found in G. Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450-900 (London 2003); I would now modify the account in some details.

21 multitudine primatum et agminum satellitum plurimorum; Fred. Cont., 24

22 D. Pérez Sánchez, El Ejército en la Sociedad Visigoda (Salamanca, 1989); R. Abels Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England (London, 1988).

23 Visigothic Law 2.2.2, 2.2.9 both issued by Chindasvinth.

24 Lex Ribvaria 33.1

25 Wickham, Framing of the Early Middle Ages, is the most recent and sophisticated attempt to argue for the existence of a wealthy and independent Frankish aristocracy before the seventh century.  For the unreferenced draft of an article attempting to counter Wickham’s argument see: http://600transformer.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/officers-or-gentlemen-frankish.html (with links to 3 subsequent instalments).  A problem with Wickham’s argument is that he does not take into account the lack of wealth and independence of the late Roman aristocracy in the region: http://600transformer.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/genesis-of-frankish-aristocracy-part-1.html (another unreferenced draft; again there are 3 subsequent parts, linked from the first).

26 G. Halsall, Settlement and Social Organisation. The Merovingian Region of Metz (Cambridge 1995), ch.9.

27 G. Halsall, ‘From Roman fundus to Carolingian Grand Domaine: crucial ruptures between late antiquity and the middle ages.’ Revue Belge de Philologie at d’Histoire 90 (2012), pp.273-98. See also G. Halsall, ‘Villas, territories and communities in Merovingian northern Gaul’ in People and Space in the Middle Ages, 300-1300, ed. W. Davies, G. Halsall & A. Reynolds (Turnhout 2006), pp.209-31.

28 Some of the issues discussed here, not least the problems with the usually adopted thesis of kingdom formation, can be found in my recent (semi-academic) volume Worlds of Arthur: Facts and Fictions of the Dark Ages (Oxford, 2013).

29 G. Halsall, ‘Northern Britain and the Fall of the Roman Empire’.  The Mediaeval Journal 2.2 (2012), pp.1-25.  See also Worlds of Arthur; http://600transformer.blogspot.co.uk/2010/10/woad-less-travelled-archaeology-of.html Cp., for the currently accepted view, S. Driscoll, ‘Power and authority in early historic Scotland: Pictish symbol stones and other documents’, in State and Society: The Emergence and Development of Social Hierarchy and Political Centralization, ed. Gledhill, J., Bender, B., & Larsen, M.T., (London 1988), pp.215-36.

30 E. H.C. Mytum, The Origins of Early Christian Ireland (London, 1992) for description.

31 Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages.

32 See, e.g., the oeuvre of A. Chavarría Arnau.

33 E.g. G. Halsall, Settlement and Social Organisation.


35 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks


37 M.J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, 1550-1650 (Cambridge 2000), ch.1 [I am enormously grateful to my student Laura Salvage for pointing me at this.].  For a view of the mainland European situation, stressing the dynamics from above and below of the state penetrating local society and which has been influential in the development of my thinking, see J. Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650. Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe (London, 2000); id., War and the State in early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1650 (London, 2002).

38 The most serious example is M.J. Innes, State and Society in the Early Middle Ages, whose argument is belied at every turn by basic factual errors and egregious misreadings of documents.  For (believe me!) mild critique, see Halsall, Warfare and Society, pp.78-81 and references.

39 See, e.g., the discussion of the state in R. Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (2008).

40 L. Althusser, On Ideology

41 J. Rancière, La Haine de la Démocratie

42 J.L. Nancy, La Communauté Désoeuvrée (trans. The Inoperative Community (Minnesota, 1991); C. Bailly & J.L. Nancy, La Comparution .

43 Gregory, Histories 6.46.

44 See, for example, R. Gerberding, The Liber Historiae Francorum and the Rise of the Carolingians (Oxford, 1987).

45 There is a long bibliography of studies of western urban and regeneration, e.g.: G. Brogiolo & B. Ward-Perkins (ed.), The Idea and the Ideal of the Town between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Leiden 1999); G. Brogiolo, N. Christie & N. Gauthier (ed.), Towns and their territories between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Leiden 2000); N. Christie & S.T. Loseby, (ed.) Towns in Transition: Urban Evolution in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Aldershot, 1996); R. Hodges & B. Hobley, The Rebirth of Towns in the West, AD 700-1050 (CBA: London); 

46 J.M.H. Smith, ‘Did women have a transformation of the Roman world?, Gender and History; G. Halsall, ‘Gender and the end of empire’, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies.

47 A point thoroughly and convincingly discussed in the work of M. Kulikowsky. E.g. Rome’s Gothic Wars From the Third Century to Alaric (Cambridge, 2006)

48 Again I can only offer a reference to a preliminary draft:  http://600transformer.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/classical-gender-in-deconstruction.html

49 A famous example is the brother of Bishop Nicetius of Lyon, who bore the name Gundulf.  Gundulf was a domesticus and later a duke at the Austrasian Frankish court and presumably took (or rather added) this name on going into secular service just as his great-nephew, Gregory of Tours, added the name Gregory upon entering the church.

50 G. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West (Cambridge 2007), pp.485-7.  Mark Handley has drawn my attention to a couple more barbara on inscriptions since then but not enough to really change the picture.

51 See further, below in the conclusion.

52 Lex Ribvaria.

53 This makes me think that the references to the Welsh as a subordinate population in the early 8th century Laws of Ine of Wessex might similarly be the outcome of a longer process with a more important shift around 600 and thus have no necessary implication for the fifth and sixth centuries, as is often supposed.

54 I have added to the discussion of this in Warfare and Society in my chapter for the forthcoming Cambridge History of War, ed. A. Curry.  This volume has been forthcoming for some time, however, and I am unsure what its current status is.

55 E.g. Lex Ribv.

56 R. Collins, The Arab Conquest of Spain (Oxford, 1989) esp. pp.42, 149, 202-3.

57 Again, following the hypothesis outlined in Worlds of Arthur, ch.11.

58 See above, n.29.

59 This can be seen no more clearly than in the difference between Gregory of Tours’ Clovis and the Clovis who emerges from documents of his own time.  Though this is not the conclusion drawn, it is thoroughly illustrated by W.M. Daley, 'Clovis: How barbaric, how pagan?' Speculum 69 (1994):619-64.